

## What if repression is an option?

R will accept offer in t=2 when

$$\text{Reduce}[(1 - x_2) * (1 + r) > \left(\frac{p}{1 + w + r}\right) * (1 + r) * (1 - d) \ \&\& \ 1 > p > 0 \ \&\& \ w > 0 \ \&\& \ r > 0 \ \&\& \ d > 0, x_2]$$

$$w > 0 \ \&\& \ 0 < p < 1 \ \&\& \ r > 0 \ \&\& \ d > 0 \ \&\& \ x_2 < \frac{1 - p + d p + r w}{1 + r w}$$

offer is

$$x_2 := \frac{1 - p + d p + r w}{1 + r w}$$

G makes this offer rather than fighting when:

$$\text{Reduce}[(x_2) * (1 + r) > \left(1 - \frac{p}{1 + w + r}\right) * (1 + r) * (1 - d) \ \&\& \ 1 > p > 0 \ \&\& \ w > 0 \ \&\& \ r > 0 \ \&\& \ d > 0, d]$$

$$0 < p < 1 \ \&\& \ w > 0 \ \&\& \ r > 0 \ \&\& \ d > 0$$

Always offer this deal. R accepts in t=1 when

$$\text{FullSimplify}[\text{Reduce}[(1 - x_1) + \delta * (1 - x_2) * (1 + r) > (p) * (1 - d) + \delta * (p) * (1 + r) * (1 - d) \ \&\& \ 1 > p > 0 \ \&\& \ w > 0 \ \&\& \ r > 0 \ \&\& \ d > 0, x_1]]$$

$$w > 0 \ \&\& \ 0 < p < 1 \ \&\& \ r > 0 \ \&\& \ d > 0 \ \&\& \ x_1 < 1 + \frac{(-1 + d) p (1 + r w (1 + \delta + r \delta))}{1 + r w}$$

$$x_1 := 1 + \frac{(-1 + d) p (1 + r w (1 + \delta + r \delta))}{1 + r w}$$

But nothing is good enough to prevent war when:

$$\text{Reduce}[(1) + \delta * (1 - x_2) * (1 + r) < (p) * (1 - d) + \delta * (p) * (1 + r) * (1 - d) \ \&\& \ 1 > p > 0 \ \&\& \ w > 0 \ \&\& \ r > 0 \ \&\& \ d > 0, p]$$

$$r > 0 \ \&\& \ \left( \left( 0 < d < 1 \ \&\& \ w > 0 \ \&\& \ \delta > \frac{-d - d r w}{-r w + d r w - r^2 w + d r^2 w} \ \&\& \ \frac{-1 - r w}{-1 + d - r w + d r w - r w \delta + d r w \delta - r^2 w \delta + d r^2 w \delta} < p < 1 \right) \ || \right. \\ \left. \left( d > 1 \ \&\& \ w > 0 \ \&\& \ \delta < \frac{-d - d r w}{-r w + d r w - r^2 w + d r^2 w} \ \&\& \ \frac{-1 - r w}{-1 + d - r w + d r w - r w \delta + d r w \delta - r^2 w \delta + d r^2 w \delta} < p < 1 \right) \right)$$

$$\text{Reduce}[\delta > \frac{-d - d r w}{-r w + d r w - r^2 w + d r^2 w} \ \&\& \ 1 > p > 0 \ \&\& \ w > 0 \ \&\& \ r > 0 \ \&\& \ d > 0, d]$$

$$\left( 0 < p < 1 \ \&\& \ w > 0 \ \&\& \ r > 0 \ \&\& \ \delta < \frac{-1 - r w}{r w + r^2 w} \ \&\& \ 1 < d < \frac{r w \delta + r^2 w \delta}{1 + r w + r w \delta + r^2 w \delta} \right) \ ||$$

$$\left( 0 < p < 1 \ \&\& \ w > 0 \ \&\& \ r > 0 \ \&\& \ \frac{-1 - r w}{r w + r^2 w} \leq \delta \leq 0 \ \&\& \ d > 1 \right) \ ||$$

$$\left( 0 < p < 1 \ \&\& \ w > 0 \ \&\& \ r > 0 \ \&\& \ \delta > 0 \ \&\& \ 0 < d < \frac{r w \delta + r^2 w \delta}{1 + r w + r w \delta + r^2 w \delta} \right) \ ||$$


$$(0 < p < 1 \ \&\& \ w > 0 \ \&\& \ r > 0 \ \&\& \ \delta > 0 \ \&\& \ d > 1)$$

```
Unset[δ]
Unset[w]
Unset[d]
```

```
δ = .95; w = 1; d = 0.2
```

```
Plot[{{ $\frac{r w \delta + r^2 w \delta}{1 + r w + r w \delta + r^2 w \delta}$ ,  $\frac{-1 - r w}{-1 + d - r w + d r w - r w \delta + d r w \delta - r^2 w \delta + d r^2 w \delta}$ },
  {r, 0, 10}, Frame → {True, True, False, False},
  FrameLabel → {"Executive Job Security", "Equilibrium Level of Repression"},
  LabelStyle → Directive[Larger],
  PlotStyle → {{Black, Thick}, {Black, Thick, Dashed}}, PlotRange → {0, 1},
  Filling → {1 → {2}}]
```

```
0.2
```



## What if repression is an option?

R will accept offer in t=2 when

```
Reduce[(1 - x2) * (1 + r) >  $\left(\frac{p}{1 + w * r}\right) * (1 + r) * (1 - d) \ \&\& \ 1 > p > 0 \ \&\& \ w > 0 \ \&\& \ r > 0 \ \&\& \ d > 0, x2]$ 
```

```
w > 0 \ \&\& \ 0 < p < 1 \ \&\& \ r > 0 \ \&\& \ d > 0 \ \&\& \ x2 <  $\frac{1 - p + d p + r w}{1 + r w}$ 
```

offer is

```
In[2]:= x2 :=  $\frac{1 - p + d p + r w}{1 + r w}$ 
```

G makes this offer rather than fighting in t=2 when:

```
Reduce[(x2) * (1 + r) >  $\left(1 - \frac{p}{1 + w * r}\right) * (1 + r) * (1 - d) \ \&\& \ 1 > p > 0 \ \&\& \ w > 0 \ \&\& \ r > 0 \ \&\& \ d > 0, d]$ 
```

```
0 < p < 1 \ \&\& \ w > 0 \ \&\& \ r > 0 \ \&\& \ d > 0
```

Always offer this deal. R accepts an offer in t=1, such that rejection entails repression, as long as

In[3]= **FullSimplify**[  
**Reduce**[(1 - x<sub>1</sub>) + δ \* (1 - x<sub>2</sub>) \* (1 + r) > ( $\frac{p}{1+\alpha}$ ) \* (1 - d) + δ \* ( $\frac{p}{1+\alpha}$ ) \* (1 + r) \* (1 - d) &&  
**1 > p > 0 && w > 0 && r > 0 && d > 0 && 0 < α < w \* r, x<sub>1</sub>]]]**

Out[3]= w > 0 && α > 0 && r >  $\frac{\alpha}{w}$  && 0 < p < 1 && d > 0 &&  
x<sub>1</sub> <  $\frac{(1+rw)(1+\alpha) + (-1+d)p(1+rw+(1+r)(rw-\alpha)\delta)}{(1+rw)(1+\alpha)}$

So G offers.

In[4]= **x<sub>1</sub> :=**  $\frac{(1+rw)(1+\alpha) + (-1+d)p(1+rw+(1+r)(rw-\alpha)\delta)}{(1+rw)(1+\alpha)}$

But nothing is good enough to prevent rejection when:

In[5]= **Reduce**[(1) + δ \* (1 - x<sub>2</sub>) \* (1 + r) < ( $\frac{p}{1+\alpha}$ ) \* (1 - d) + δ \* ( $\frac{p}{1+\alpha}$ ) \* (1 + r) \* (1 - d) &&  
**1 > p > 0 && w > 0 && r > 0 && d > 0 && 0 < α < w \* r, p]**

Out[5]= α > 0 && ((0 < d < 1 && r > 0 && w >  $\frac{\alpha}{r}$  &&  
 $\delta > \frac{-d-drw-\alpha-rw\alpha}{-rw+drw-r^2w+dr^2w+\alpha-d\alpha+r\alpha-dr\alpha}$  && (-1-rw-α-rwα) / (-1+d-rw+  
 $drw-rw\delta+drw\delta-r^2w\delta+dr^2w\delta+\alpha\delta-d\alpha\delta+r\alpha\delta-dr\alpha\delta) < p < 1$ ) ||  
( $d > 1$  && r > 0 && w >  $\frac{\alpha}{r}$  &&  $\delta < \frac{-d-drw-\alpha-rw\alpha}{-rw+drw-r^2w+dr^2w+\alpha-d\alpha+r\alpha-dr\alpha}$  &&  
(-1-rw-α-rwα) /  
(-1+d-rw+drw-rwδ+drwδ-r<sup>2</sup>wδ+dr<sup>2</sup>wδ+αδ-dαδ+rαδ-drαδ) < p < 1))

In[7]= **Reduce**[ $\delta > \frac{-d-drw-\alpha-rw\alpha}{-rw+drw-r^2w+dr^2w+\alpha-d\alpha+r\alpha-dr\alpha}$  &&  
**1 > p > 0 && w > 0 && r > 0 && d > 0 && w \* r > α > 0, d]**

Out[7]= (0 < p < 1 && α > 0 && r > 0 && w >  $\frac{\alpha}{r}$  &&  
 $\delta < \frac{-1-rw}{rw+r^2w-\alpha-r\alpha}$  &&  $1 < d < \frac{\alpha+rw\alpha-rw\delta-r^2w\delta+\alpha\delta+r\alpha\delta}{-1-rw-rw\delta-r^2w\delta+\alpha\delta+r\alpha\delta}$ ) ||  
(0 < p < 1 && α > 0 && r > 0 && w >  $\frac{\alpha}{r}$  &&  $\frac{-1-rw}{rw+r^2w-\alpha-r\alpha} \leq \delta \leq \frac{-\alpha-rw\alpha}{-rw-r^2w+\alpha+r\alpha}$  && d > 1) ||  
(0 < p < 1 && α > 0 && r > 0 && w >  $\frac{\alpha}{r}$  &&  
 $\delta > \frac{-\alpha-rw\alpha}{-rw-r^2w+\alpha+r\alpha}$  && 0 < d <  $\frac{\alpha+rw\alpha-rw\delta-r^2w\delta+\alpha\delta+r\alpha\delta}{-1-rw-rw\delta-r^2w\delta+\alpha\delta+r\alpha\delta}$ ) ||  
(0 < p < 1 && α > 0 && r > 0 && w >  $\frac{\alpha}{r}$  &&  $\delta > \frac{-\alpha-rw\alpha}{-rw-r^2w+\alpha+r\alpha}$  && d > 1)

**Unset**[δ]


**Unset**[w]

**Unset**[d]

In[36]:=  $\delta = .95; w = 1; d = 0.2; \alpha = .5$

```
Plot[{{
   $\frac{rw\delta + r^2w\delta}{1 + rw + rw\delta + r^2w\delta}$ ,
   $\frac{-1 - rw}{-1 + d - rw + drw - rw\delta + drw\delta - r^2w\delta + dr^2w\delta}$ ,
   $\frac{\alpha + rw\alpha - rw\delta - r^2w\delta + \alpha\delta + r\alpha\delta}{-1 - rw - rw\delta - r^2w\delta + \alpha\delta + r\alpha\delta}$ ,
   $\frac{-1 - rw - \alpha - r\alpha}{-1 - rw - \alpha - r\alpha}$ 
},
{r, 0, 10}, Frame -> {True, True, False, False},
FrameLabel -> {"newly discovered oil resources, r", "war thresholds on d and p"},
LabelStyle -> Directive[Larger], PlotStyle ->
{{Black, Thick}, {Black, Thick, Dashed}, {Red, Thick}, {Red, Thick, Dashed}},
PlotRange -> {0, 1}, Filling -> {1 -> {{2}, {None, GrayLevel[0.69]}}},
Filling -> {3 -> {{4}, {None, Red}}}]
```

Out[36]= 0.5



Out[37]=